This is a procedural choice, not a vote on the merits of any
particular future policy. Its consequences would extend beyond one election or
controversy. Understanding the proposal requires separating what the amendment
legally changes from the arguments about whether those changes would improve
governance. This explainer presents both perspectives without recommending a
vote.
What Amendment L Would Change
The Legislature placed Amendment L on the ballot through
House Joint Resolution 5003, approved in 2025. The attorney general’s final
explanation identifies the proposed change as an increase in the approval
requirement for state constitutional amendments or revisions. Under the
proposal, receiving a majority would no longer be enough unless affirmative
votes also reached 60% of votes cast on the measure.
The new threshold would apply whether a future
constitutional amendment reached the ballot through a citizen initiative or a
legislative referral. It would not change the U.S. Constitution’s amendment
process. Amendment L itself is being considered under South Dakota’s existing
majority-vote rule; its proposed higher threshold concerns future
constitutional changes. The relevant denominator is votes cast on the question,
not every registered voter or the state’s entire population.

Ordinary Statutory Laws Would Remain Separate
The proposed 60% requirement applies exclusively to South
Dakota constitutional amendments and revisions—not ordinary statutory ballot
measures. Initiated laws and referred statutory laws would retain their
existing simple-majority approval rule. In everyday language, this is often
called “50% plus one vote”: more than half of the votes cast on the question,
rather than exactly half.
Ordinary legislation enacted by lawmakers would also remain
under its existing procedures. Those procedures generally require a majority of
all elected members in each legislative chamber, alongside the applicable
executive process. However, some actions already require larger votes, such as
emergency legislation or overriding a veto. It would therefore be inaccurate to
say every legislative action currently passes by a simple majority. Amendment L
would neither create a blanket 60% requirement for statutes nor eliminate
existing legislative exceptions.
Why Constitutional Rules Are Different
A constitution establishes the structure, powers, and limits
of government. South Dakota’s Constitution includes provisions governing the
Legislature, executive branch, courts, and individual rights. Statutes operate
within that framework. A law cannot validly override an applicable
constitutional restriction merely because it enjoys majority support. State
constitutional provisions, in turn, remain subject to the U.S. Constitution and
controlling federal law.
This distinction explains why supporters of higher amendment
thresholds view constitutional change differently from routine policymaking.
Ordinary laws can respond to changing priorities, while foundational rules are
meant to provide continuity. Yet constitutional text can also contain detailed
policy choices, and voters may disagree about which subjects belong there. The
importance of constitutional rules does not, by itself, settle whether 60% is
the best approval threshold.
A Shared-Resources Example—and Its Limits
Imagine five people pooling resources for a shared project.
Under an unrestricted majority-vote arrangement, four could approve
reallocating those resources even if the fifth objected. Numerical support
decides the result. But suppose the group first adopts a charter specifying
ownership rights, permitted uses, and procedures for changing its rules. A
routine vote would then have to comply with that charter; popularity alone
would not authorize ignoring it.
The analogy helps distinguish decisions made under
established rules from decisions to rewrite those rules. Supporters of
supermajorities argue that changing a group’s foundational agreement should
require broader consent. Opponents caution that an elevated threshold can also
preserve an unfair or outdated agreement against the wishes of most
participants. Both concerns become relevant when choosing how a charter may be
amended.
The numbers reveal a limitation: four of five is 80%,
satisfying both a simple-majority rule and a 60% rule. Even three of five is
exactly 60%. The five-person example therefore illustrates constitutional
limits, but not the practical difference between these two thresholds. A larger
example is needed. Also, a constitutional republic can use democratic voting
procedures; “republic” and “democracy” are not mutually exclusive descriptions.
How the Numbers Would Work
Suppose exactly 100,000 valid votes are cast on a future
constitutional amendment. Under the current rule, 50,001 affirmative votes
would constitute a majority. Under Amendment L’s proposed rule, at least 60,000
affirmative votes would be required. A proposal receiving 59,000 yes votes and
41,000 no votes would pass under the current threshold but fail under the
proposed one. Exactly 60,000 yes votes would meet the higher threshold.
Thus, more than 40% voting no could prevent adoption under a
60% requirement. That is the same feature described differently by the two
sides: supporters see a demand for broader agreement; opponents see a blocking
power for a minority. Neither description changes the arithmetic. Importantly,
the hypothetical 59% result on an ordinary statutory ballot measure would
remain sufficient for passage under the unchanged majority rule.

The Case for a Higher Threshold
The principal argument for Amendment L is that foundational
rules should require stronger agreement than ordinary policy decisions. A
higher threshold can make constitutional change less dependent on a narrow
electoral margin. Supporters view this as a way to encourage proposals that
appeal across disagreements and to preserve a more stable governing framework.
Another argument concerns the distinction between
constitutions and statutes. Supporters contend that detailed policies should
generally be debated as ordinary laws rather than embedded in the constitution.
Requiring 60% could discourage using constitutional amendments for matters
better handled through the statutory process. This is a rationale for the
proposal, not an assurance about how future campaigns or voters would behave.
This is the stance that I support. I believe that our state constitution desrves the same level of requirements for change as the federal constitution!
The Case for Keeping Majority Approval
The principal argument against Amendment L is that a
majority should retain the ability to approve constitutional changes. Under a
higher threshold, a proposal could win substantially more yes votes than no
votes and still fail. Opponents consider that a significant restriction on
popular decision-making, especially when citizens use constitutional
initiatives to pursue changes lawmakers have not adopted.
A higher threshold also protects existing provisions
regardless of whether they remain appropriate. Correcting an outdated rule
would require the same 60% support as introducing a new one. Opponents
therefore distinguish constitutional stability from constitutional improvement:
a rule that slows change can slow desirable reforms as well. The neutral
assessment is that Amendment L raises the adoption barrier without deciding
which future proposals deserve approval.
Rights Protection Is Not Just a Percentage
Constitutional safeguards can protect individuals and
minorities against unlawful government action. But a voting threshold is only
one procedural safeguard. A measure supported by 60% is not automatically fair,
and a measure supported by 51% is not automatically unjust. Rights protections
also depend on constitutional language, judicial enforcement, and limits
imposed by federal law.
The federal amendment process demonstrates a different
approach: Article V ordinarily requires proposal by two-thirds of both
congressional chambers and ratification by three-fourths of the states, with an
alternative convention route. Those requirements apply to institutions and
states, not a nationwide popular vote. They illustrate heightened consent for
constitutional change without establishing that every state must use the same
system or percentage.
What a Yes or No Vote Means
A yes vote supports adopting the proposed 60% threshold for
future South Dakota constitutional amendments and revisions. A no vote supports
retaining the current majority threshold. Neither choice changes the
simple-majority rule for ordinary statutory ballot measures. The central
trade-off is between requiring broader agreement before changing foundational
rules and preserving majority-supported access to constitutional reform.
Reading the official explanation alongside clearly identified arguments from both
sides helps keep that procedural decision distinct from predictions, slogans,
or unrelated policy preferences.
Vote YES on Amendment L!
Sources and Further Reading
·
South
Dakota Secretary of State: 2026 ballot questions — official designation and
legislative origin of Amendment L.
·
Attorney
general’s final Amendment L explanation — current majority rule and
proposed 60% requirement.
·
Official
2026 ballot question pamphlet — official explanations and separately
attributed proponent and opponent statements.
·
South Dakota Constitution,
Article III and official
state Constitution — legislative procedures and constitutional framework.
·
South
Dakota initiative and referendum statutes — statutory ballot-measure
procedures.
·
Ballotpedia:
Amendment L overview — coverage of initiated and referred constitutional
amendments.
·
South
Dakota Searchlight: Amendment L explained — competing perspectives on
constitutional stability and voters’ access to reform.
·
National
Archives: Article V — federal constitutional amendment requirements.
· State announcement of the proposal — November 3, 2026 election date.
