Thursday, October 29, 2026

South Dakota Amendment L: Understanding the Proposed 60% Threshold

On November 3, 2026, South Dakota voters will consider Amendment L, a proposal about how future changes to the state Constitution are approved. Today, a proposed constitutional amendment or revision passes when it receives more than half of the votes cast on that question. Amendment L would replace that simple-majority threshold with a requirement of at least 60%. The measure asks a fundamental question: how much agreement should be necessary to change the rules that govern government itself?

This is a procedural choice, not a vote on the merits of any particular future policy. Its consequences would extend beyond one election or controversy. Understanding the proposal requires separating what the amendment legally changes from the arguments about whether those changes would improve governance. This explainer presents both perspectives without recommending a vote.

What Amendment L Would Change

The Legislature placed Amendment L on the ballot through House Joint Resolution 5003, approved in 2025. The attorney general’s final explanation identifies the proposed change as an increase in the approval requirement for state constitutional amendments or revisions. Under the proposal, receiving a majority would no longer be enough unless affirmative votes also reached 60% of votes cast on the measure.

The new threshold would apply whether a future constitutional amendment reached the ballot through a citizen initiative or a legislative referral. It would not change the U.S. Constitution’s amendment process. Amendment L itself is being considered under South Dakota’s existing majority-vote rule; its proposed higher threshold concerns future constitutional changes. The relevant denominator is votes cast on the question, not every registered voter or the state’s entire population.



Ordinary Statutory Laws Would Remain Separate

The proposed 60% requirement applies exclusively to South Dakota constitutional amendments and revisions—not ordinary statutory ballot measures. Initiated laws and referred statutory laws would retain their existing simple-majority approval rule. In everyday language, this is often called “50% plus one vote”: more than half of the votes cast on the question, rather than exactly half.

Ordinary legislation enacted by lawmakers would also remain under its existing procedures. Those procedures generally require a majority of all elected members in each legislative chamber, alongside the applicable executive process. However, some actions already require larger votes, such as emergency legislation or overriding a veto. It would therefore be inaccurate to say every legislative action currently passes by a simple majority. Amendment L would neither create a blanket 60% requirement for statutes nor eliminate existing legislative exceptions.

Why Constitutional Rules Are Different

A constitution establishes the structure, powers, and limits of government. South Dakota’s Constitution includes provisions governing the Legislature, executive branch, courts, and individual rights. Statutes operate within that framework. A law cannot validly override an applicable constitutional restriction merely because it enjoys majority support. State constitutional provisions, in turn, remain subject to the U.S. Constitution and controlling federal law.

This distinction explains why supporters of higher amendment thresholds view constitutional change differently from routine policymaking. Ordinary laws can respond to changing priorities, while foundational rules are meant to provide continuity. Yet constitutional text can also contain detailed policy choices, and voters may disagree about which subjects belong there. The importance of constitutional rules does not, by itself, settle whether 60% is the best approval threshold.

A Shared-Resources Example—and Its Limits

Imagine five people pooling resources for a shared project. Under an unrestricted majority-vote arrangement, four could approve reallocating those resources even if the fifth objected. Numerical support decides the result. But suppose the group first adopts a charter specifying ownership rights, permitted uses, and procedures for changing its rules. A routine vote would then have to comply with that charter; popularity alone would not authorize ignoring it.

The analogy helps distinguish decisions made under established rules from decisions to rewrite those rules. Supporters of supermajorities argue that changing a group’s foundational agreement should require broader consent. Opponents caution that an elevated threshold can also preserve an unfair or outdated agreement against the wishes of most participants. Both concerns become relevant when choosing how a charter may be amended.

The numbers reveal a limitation: four of five is 80%, satisfying both a simple-majority rule and a 60% rule. Even three of five is exactly 60%. The five-person example therefore illustrates constitutional limits, but not the practical difference between these two thresholds. A larger example is needed. Also, a constitutional republic can use democratic voting procedures; “republic” and “democracy” are not mutually exclusive descriptions.

How the Numbers Would Work

Suppose exactly 100,000 valid votes are cast on a future constitutional amendment. Under the current rule, 50,001 affirmative votes would constitute a majority. Under Amendment L’s proposed rule, at least 60,000 affirmative votes would be required. A proposal receiving 59,000 yes votes and 41,000 no votes would pass under the current threshold but fail under the proposed one. Exactly 60,000 yes votes would meet the higher threshold.

Thus, more than 40% voting no could prevent adoption under a 60% requirement. That is the same feature described differently by the two sides: supporters see a demand for broader agreement; opponents see a blocking power for a minority. Neither description changes the arithmetic. Importantly, the hypothetical 59% result on an ordinary statutory ballot measure would remain sufficient for passage under the unchanged majority rule.

The Case for a Higher Threshold

The principal argument for Amendment L is that foundational rules should require stronger agreement than ordinary policy decisions. A higher threshold can make constitutional change less dependent on a narrow electoral margin. Supporters view this as a way to encourage proposals that appeal across disagreements and to preserve a more stable governing framework.

Another argument concerns the distinction between constitutions and statutes. Supporters contend that detailed policies should generally be debated as ordinary laws rather than embedded in the constitution. Requiring 60% could discourage using constitutional amendments for matters better handled through the statutory process. This is a rationale for the proposal, not an assurance about how future campaigns or voters would behave.

This is the stance that I support. I believe that our state constitution desrves the same level of requirements for change as the federal constitution!

The Case for Keeping Majority Approval

The principal argument against Amendment L is that a majority should retain the ability to approve constitutional changes. Under a higher threshold, a proposal could win substantially more yes votes than no votes and still fail. Opponents consider that a significant restriction on popular decision-making, especially when citizens use constitutional initiatives to pursue changes lawmakers have not adopted.

A higher threshold also protects existing provisions regardless of whether they remain appropriate. Correcting an outdated rule would require the same 60% support as introducing a new one. Opponents therefore distinguish constitutional stability from constitutional improvement: a rule that slows change can slow desirable reforms as well. The neutral assessment is that Amendment L raises the adoption barrier without deciding which future proposals deserve approval.

Rights Protection Is Not Just a Percentage

Constitutional safeguards can protect individuals and minorities against unlawful government action. But a voting threshold is only one procedural safeguard. A measure supported by 60% is not automatically fair, and a measure supported by 51% is not automatically unjust. Rights protections also depend on constitutional language, judicial enforcement, and limits imposed by federal law.

The federal amendment process demonstrates a different approach: Article V ordinarily requires proposal by two-thirds of both congressional chambers and ratification by three-fourths of the states, with an alternative convention route. Those requirements apply to institutions and states, not a nationwide popular vote. They illustrate heightened consent for constitutional change without establishing that every state must use the same system or percentage.

What a Yes or No Vote Means

A yes vote supports adopting the proposed 60% threshold for future South Dakota constitutional amendments and revisions. A no vote supports retaining the current majority threshold. Neither choice changes the simple-majority rule for ordinary statutory ballot measures. The central trade-off is between requiring broader agreement before changing foundational rules and preserving majority-supported access to constitutional reform. Reading the official explanation alongside clearly identified arguments from both sides helps keep that procedural decision distinct from predictions, slogans, or unrelated policy preferences.

Vote YES on Amendment L!

Sources and Further Reading

·         South Dakota Secretary of State: 2026 ballot questions — official designation and legislative origin of Amendment L.

·         Attorney general’s final Amendment L explanation — current majority rule and proposed 60% requirement.

·         Official 2026 ballot question pamphlet — official explanations and separately attributed proponent and opponent statements.

·         South Dakota Constitution, Article III and official state Constitution — legislative procedures and constitutional framework.

·         South Dakota initiative and referendum statutes — statutory ballot-measure procedures.

·         Ballotpedia: Amendment L overview — coverage of initiated and referred constitutional amendments.

·         South Dakota Searchlight: Amendment L explained — competing perspectives on constitutional stability and voters’ access to reform.

·         National Archives: Article V — federal constitutional amendment requirements.

·         State announcement of the proposal — November 3, 2026 election date.